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1. Introduction 
Network operators typically use quite sophisticated pricing policies. For instance, nonlinear 
pricing (second degree price discrimination) has a long tradition in the telecommunication and 
energy sectors. Similarly, in these and other sectors, prices are often differentiated according to 
market segments (third degree discrimination). Even though it is not the most prominent 
textbook example to illustrate such pricing policies, the postal sector is in fact no exception. 
Ramsey pricing is effectively a form of third degree price discrimination, based on price 
elasticities. In addition, most postal operators have volume discount programs (a form of 
nonlinear pricing). While regulators and competition authorities are often reluctant to accept 
these practices, economists tend to view differentiated pricing policies in a more positive way.1 
For a regulated operator, they are an effective way to cover fixed cost while mitigating 
distortions that would be associated with linear pricing. When the regulatory policy is well 
designed and the operator is welfare maximizing, sophisticated pricing policies can only be 
welfare enhancing. However, when the operator is profit maximizing, this is no longer 
necessarily true: the scenario where a profit-maximizing operator may engage in pricing 
policies that are detrimental to welfare can then no longer be ruled out. Still, the literature has 
shown that departures from linear pricing are often welfare enhancing, even when the operator 
is profit maximizing.2  
 The implications of differentiated pricing policies for the postal sector have received little 
attention in the literature. A notable exception is Crew and Kleindorfer (2011, 2012) who study 
the implications of volume discounts. They show that nonlinear pricing can contribute to the 
financial viability of an operator who faces market opening and intermodal competition (in 
particular from electronic media).  
 In this paper we study pricing policies, which combine market segmentation (third degree 
price discrimination) with nonlinear pricing (second degree price discrimination)  - referred to 
as “segmented nonlinear pricing” (SNLP). More precisely, we assume that the operator can 
group customers into a certain number of categories on the basis of an exogenously observable 
characteristic at no cost. Under standard third degree discrimination, the operator charges linear 
prices that differ across categories. Under SNLP, the operator can use category-specific 
nonlinear tariffs. This is common practice for telecommunications (particularly mobile phone), 
in the advertising market and in the airline sector among other. It is also often referred to as 
tagging in particular in the public economics literature.3 In the postal sector, SNLP has a 
number of potential applications and there already exist some examples where it is used in 
practice.  
 One of the pluses of SNLP is that it improves the design of volume discounts by targeting 
them to the categories of customers who are most likely to switch to electronic substitutes. In a 
context of decreasing mail volume, such pricing policies could mitigate this decrease and boost 
volumes. Consequently, this could become a crucial factor in safeguarding universal postal 
service.4  
 While our analysis provides a methodological contribution that goes beyond the postal 
                                                 
1 Geradin (2011) and Eccles (2012) give a clear description of the key principles of EU and national competition 
laws on price discrimination in relation to the postal Directive. 
2 Willig (1978) provided an early discussion. Aguirre et al. (2010) is a rather comprehensive study of the welfare 
impact of third degree price discrimination 
3.This paper and a number of others, which are referenced in Cremer et al. (2010)studies the design of nonlinear 
tax schedules that can be conditioned on some observable characteristic (like age or gender). While this appears at 
first to be a very different question from the one we are considering here, the formal problem is very similar. 
4 A similar point is made by Crew and Kleindorfer (2012).  
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sector, we focus our attention on specific postal issues. This is reflected in our illustrative 
examples but also in our modeling assumptions. In particular, we include the feature that 
customers always have the option to use the public stamp rate (reservation utility is determined 
by a linear tariff and is thus type-specific).  
 The design of nonlinear tariffs is first and foremost an issue of asymmetric information. 
The operator does not observe the individual customer’s willingness to pay. Under full 
information, the operator would induce an efficient allocation. This is because it can extract the 
entire surplus and thus chooses a policy to maximize it. Under asymmetric information, there is 
a trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency and quantities are distorted (typically 
downward) to mitigate informational rents. Under SNLP, the operator observes the customer’s 
category, which provides some information about the distribution of his type (willingness to 
pay). More precisely, it can use the intra category distribution of types (rather than the overall 
distribution) to offer segment-specific tariffs.  
 We characterize the solution under SNLP in a simple four types, two categories setting 
and compare it to the standard NLP (nonlinear pricing) solution. We provide a set of sufficient 
conditions under which SNLP (used by a profit maximizing operator) is welfare improving. 
When these conditions are violated, a welfare improvement continues to be possible, but 
whether it materializes depends on the preference and cost structure. For either case, we use 
numerical examples to study the impact of the pricing schemes on the various customer groups 
and on the operator’s profit.  
 We start by presenting some examples of SNLP schemes in various sectors (Section 2). 
Then we develop the basic model, wherein the willingness to pay in the two groups does not 
overlap and where the reservation utility is exogenous and the same for all individuals. This is 
the simplest setting and yields the most clear-cut results. We then study two extensions. In the 
first, we consider the case of overlapping groups (Subsection 1). In the second, we assume that 
a simple linear tariff (the stamp price) is available to all customers and determines their 
reservation utility levels (Subsection 2). We study how this specific feature of the postal sector 
affects our results. Finally we provide some illustrative numerical examples in Section 8.  
 
2. Some examples of segmented nonlinear pricing schemes 
Price discrimination is pervasive in all sectors of the economy. Firms use price discrimination 
to stimulate demand and increase their profit, but this practice could also be socially beneficial. 
In particular, in industries with huge fixed costs (and low marginal costs), such as the postal 
sector, price discrimination allows firms to spread fixed costs over a larger number of units and 
brings the market equilibrium closer to the social optimum. In sectors where volumes are 
shrinking, such as in the postal sector which is facing electronic substitution, price 
discrimination could make sense to maintain the minimum output level permitting to remain 
financially viable and safeguard the USO.  
 In practice, what economists call “second degree price discrimination” is particularly 
widespread: firms set a price per unit which varies with the number of units bought by the 
customer. This can be achieved through volume discounts or the adoption of a two-part tariff. 
Through these nonlinear pricing schemes, the supplier provides incentives for the customers to 
“self-select” into categories according to their preferences. Consequently the supplier can 
charge different prices to the different groups. Volume discounts are particularly well 
developed in the postal sector as well as in many other sectors producing intermediate goods. In 
practice, different rates may apply to differences in product quality as well as quantity. For 
example, airlines often offer multiple classes of seats on flights, such as first class and economy 
class. Similarly, most postal operators distinguish direct mail from transactional mail, services 
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with different transit time and quality of service. This form of discrimination based on quality is 
a mean to segment mail senders and to charge the transactional mail senders more than direct 
mailers, because the former have typically a less elastic demand.  
 When the suppliers are able to differentiate between consumer classes, pricing policy is 
referred to as “third degree discrimination”: suppliers charge different prices to different groups 
of customers depending on their elasticity of demand. Price varies by attributes such as 
location, time or observed characteristics of the customer. Many movie theaters, leisure parks 
and tourist attractions have different admission prices according to the market segment; people 
are segmented into youth, student, adult, and senior groups. Each of these groups typically has a 
different demand function, based on different levels of disposable income.  
 These two types of discrimination are not mutually exclusive: a supplier may vary pricing 
by category of customers and offer volume discounts as well. Such practices are common to 
many economic sectors. A first example of the combination of second and third degree price 
discrimination can be found in the advertising market. For example, in France, major TV 
networks offer both rebates based on volume as well as “sectorial rebates” to advertisers in 
order to induce them to place more ads on TV programs. For example, France Televisions 
(French public channels) offer rebates to retailers and distance sellers (4 percent), to telecom 
providers (7 percent), to agricultural, gardening or DIY advertisers (7 percent). New advertisers 
are offered a rebate of 5 percent. Another discrimination criterion is the size of the advertisers: 
small ones (in terms of revenues) benefit from a discount of 10 percent.  
 Other examples of policies that combine types of price discrimination can be found in the 
travel industry. Airlines companies typically offer volume discounts to wholesalers, 
consolidators and tour operators, lower prices for customers who stay over on Saturday nights 
or buy their tickets in advance, and also roundtrip discounts. Airline price discrimination 
represents an attempt to charge business travelers more than leisure travelers (because the 
formers have a less elastic demand than the latter), but also to charge more for leisure travel 
during school holidays and for immediate departure than respectively travelling in low seasons 
and early booking through seasonal pricing and advance discounts.  
 In the telecommunication sector, prices generally decrease with the quantity of 
communication time consumed and vary according to the time of the day (different rates are 
applied for daytime, evening and week-end calls). In the energy sector, nonlinear tariffs are 
segmented by time, through peak and off-peak tariffs.  
 In the postal sector, this double discrimination appears to be less common (at least for the 
time being). Nevertheless, some examples can be found. In particular, several postal operators 
offer tariffs that combine second and third degree price discrimination for nonprofit 
organizations. In the US this specific category of mail senders has been benefitting since 1951 
from reduced rates compared to other categories of senders. To qualify for these special terms, 
organizations must prove that they are both organized and operated for a qualifying primary 
purpose, that they are not organized for profit and that none of the organization’s net income is 
intended to benefit any individual or private shareholder. Eight categories of nonprofit 
organizations are eligible for this rate: religious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, 
agricultural, labor, veterans and fraternal. In addition, these nonprofit organizations can benefit 
from volume discounts. This specific segmented nonlinear pricing scheme between profit and 
nonprofit organizations has since then been adopted by several postal operators (bpost, Posten 
AB, Australian Post, Poste Italiane among others). Recently, the French operator La Poste has 
launched an offer: since October 2011, nonprofit organizations, recognized as such by a legal 
act, are eligible to the offer “Integral Utilite Publique”, characterized by a reduced rate. 
Recently several operators have also experimented with direct mail products that offer 
discounts when the mailing campaign is targeting new customers. These pricing scheme induce 
direct mailers to target new customers and to increase their mail demand, the lower return on 
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investment (sending mail to prospective advertising targets is likely to be less profitable than 
sending mail to already known targets) being partially compensated by lower expenditure on 
postage. Duncan et al. (2011)  present  examples which include “USPS Summer Sale” and 
“Royal Mail Sale”, where postal operators propose short-term discounts and special offers. 
These authors also argue that sectorial price discrimination ought to be considered because 
underlying purposes, costs and revenues of the campaigns vary between sectors.  
 We now turn to a basic model to study the impact of various pricing schemes, notably the 
combination of second and third price discrimination practices (through segmented nonlinear 
pricing schemes), on welfare.  
 
3. Basic model 
The utility of a customer of type i  who consumes quantity iq  and pays it  is given by  
 ( )i i iu q t    
where u  is an increasing and strictly concave ( 0u    and 0u   ) of the consumption level 
iq , while i  is a parameter reflecting the valuation of the good. When the consumer does not 
buy the good he has a given utility level 0u  (the same for all types) which we can normalize to 
zero without loss of generality. There are two categories of customers, a  and b , and each 
category consists of two types of customers, 1 and 2, differing in their willingness to pay, with a 
higher willingness to pay for customer 2. Overall there are thus 4 types of individuals 
characterized by their valuation of the good: 1 2 1 2a a b b      , with 1 2j j  , j a b  . Assume 
for the moment that 2 1a b   so that the two groups do not overlap; see Figure 1. In other 
words the consumer with the highest valuation in group a  has a lower willingness to pay than 
the consumer with the lowest valuation in group b  The distribution of types is common 
knowledge and the number of type i  individuals is denoted in , where 1 2 1 2i a a b b    .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There is a single operator whose cost function is given by 
 1 2 1 2( )a a b b i i i
i
C q q q q F n c q       
where ic  is the constant marginal cost which may or may not be the same for all types.  
 We consider nonlinear pricing and segmentation in the worst possible light  by assuming 
Figure 1: Separate groups
1a 2a 1b 2b
Group a Group b
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that the operator maximizes profit. When the operator is welfare maximizing more 
sophisticated pricing policies can only lead to a welfare improvement. However, when the 
operator is profit maximizing, there is a potential conflict between private and social objectives. 
A more sophisticated pricing policy then necessarily leads to a higher profit, but its impact on 
welfare is a priori ambiguous.  
 
4. Nonlinear pricing without tagging (NLP) 
With the assumption that groups are separate we have 1 2 1 2a a b b      . We assume here 
and throughout the paper that incentive constraints are binding according to decreasing (and 
adjacent)  .5 To simplify notation (and without loss of generality) we normalize in ’s to 1.  
 The profit-maximizing problem of the operator can then be written as follows 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2max ( )a a b b a a a a b b b bt t t t F c q c q c q c q         (1) 
 2 2 2 2 1 1s t ( ) ( )b b b b b bu q t u q t        (2) 
 1 1 1 1 2 2( ) ( )b b b b a au q t u q t      (3) 
 2 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( )a a a a a au q t u q t      (4) 
 1 1 1( ) 0a a au q t      (5) 
 
The decision variables are ( )i it q , 1 2 1 2i a a b b    . To set up this problem we have used the 
standard textbook result that the participation constraint is binding for the low type (equation 
5), while the utility level of the other types is determined by a series of binding incentive 
constraints (equations 2–4). The easiest way to solve this problem is to substitute the it ’s in the 
objective function from the constraints. Combining the last two constraints we obtain 
 2 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( )a a a a a at u q u q       (6) 
which together with (3) yields 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b b b a a a a at u q u q u q           (7) 
 
Combining this equation with (2) yields  
 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b b b b b b a a a a at u q u q u q u q               (8) 
 
Substituting these expressions into the objective function (1) yields the following reformulated 
problem 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a a b b
a a a a b b b b a a a a b b b bq q q q
u q u q u q u q F c q c q c q c q   
  
         
 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) 3( ) ( )b b b b a a a a au q u q u q             (9) 
 
The first line of this expression represents total surplus, while the second line measures the total 
informational rents that have to be conceded. Under full information (first degree price 
discrimination) where no informational rents are conceded, the operator maximizes total 
surplus, which it can then totally absorb. The objective function then reduces to the first line of 
(9). This would yield a (first-best) optimal solution which is given by  
 2 2 2( )b b bu q c      (10) 
                                                 
5With two types this is necessarily the case. With more than two types this involves some assumptions on the 
distribution of types (similar to the monotone hazard rate assumption in the continuum case). Without such a 
regularity assumption we could get solutions with “bunching” (two types receive the same consumption bundles). 
This would make the analysis more cumbersome without affecting the results. 
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 1 1 1( )b b bu q c      (11) 
 2 2 2( )a a au q c      (12) 
 1 1 1( )a a au q c      (13) 
 
When the customers’ willingness to pay is private information the operator cannot extract the 
full surplus and this introduces a wedge between private and social surplus.  
Differentiating (9) with respect to the consumption levels of the different types yields the 
following first-order conditions (FOCs) 
 2 2 2( )
nt
b b bu q c     (14) 
 1 2 1 1(2 ) ( )
nt
b b b bu q c      (15) 
 2 1 2 2(3 2 ) ( )
nt
a b a au q c      (16) 
 1 2 1 1(4 3 ) ( )
nt
a a a au q c      (17) 
 
where the superscript nt  is used to refer to the non-tagged (or NLP) solution.6  
 
Comparing the NLP solution defined by (14)–(17) with the first-best allocation given by 
(10)–(13) yields: 
 2 2
nt
b bq q
   (18) 
 1 1
nt
b bq q
   (19) 
 2 2
nt
a aq q
   (20) 
 1 1
nt
a aq q
   (21) 
 
These expressions show that we have the first-best solution (“no distortion at the top”) for the 
type with the highest willingness to pay, and lower than (socially) optimal consumption levels 
for all other types. These are all standard properties of NLP models. In particular, the downward 
distortion on the consumption level of any given group mitigates the informational rents of all 
types with higher willingness to pay.7  
 
5. Nonlinear pricing with tagging (SNLP) 
We now assume that the group a  or b  to which a customer belongs is observable and that the 
pricing schedule (price-quantity bundle) can be conditioned on j a b  . Note that while 
categories a  and b  are observable, the position (1 or 2) of the customer inside the category is 
not observable. For example, if an individual is of type a , the operator knows that his 
willingness to pay parameter is either 1a or 2a , but it cannot distinguish between these two 
types. Observe that since the distribution of types is common knowledge, the operator also 
knows the distribution of willingness to pay, conditional on the group. Roughly speaking the 
tagging (or segmentation) thus amounts to using some observable information to get more 
                                                 
6The solution described by these expressions is of course only meaningful when all the q ’s are positive and when 
the consumption level increases with  . This is where the assumptions on the distribution of  ’s we mentioned 
above are needed. If either of these conditions is violated the solution involves bunching of two or more types. We 
would then have to consider a number of different cases. This does not involve any major difficulty but it would 
complicate the exposition and distract attention away from the main point we want to make. 
7This can be seen from the second line of expression (9). This effect is not relevant for the type with the highest 
willingness to pay which explains that 2 2
nt
b bq q
   
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“precise” (albeit still incomplete) information on the customers’ willingness to pay.  
 To determine the optimal policy in tag j a b    we solve  
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 1 1
1 1 1
max ( )
s t ( ) ( )
( ) 0
j j j j
j j j j j jq q t t
j j j j j j
j j j
t t F c q c q
u q t u q t
u q t
 

  
   
     
  
 
Within each group the participation constraint of the low type and the incentive constraint of the 
high type are binding. Observe that we no longer have to worry about incentive constraints 
“between groups”. For instance individuals of type 2b  can take benefit from the pricing 
scheme designed for type1b , but they cannot benefit from any of the pricing schemes designed 
for group a  (because the category to which the individual belongs is observable).  
 Combining the constraints like in the non-tagged case and substituting into the objective 
function we obtain in each tag j a b   
 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 1
max ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
j j
j j j j j j j jq q
j j j
u q u q F c q c q
u q
 
 

   
    
Once again, the first line of this expression represents the total surplus (within the group), while 
the second line represents the informational rent that has to be conceded.  
 The FOCs are given by 
 2 2 2( )
t
j j ju q c    (22) 
 1 2 1 1(2 ) ( )
t
j j j ju q c      (23) 
 
where the superscript t  is used to refer to the tagged (i.e., SNLP) solution. Comparing this 
solution with the first-best allocation given by (10)–(13) yields  
 2 2
t
j jq q
   (24) 
 1 1
t
j jq q
   (25) 
 
These expressions show that we now have the first-best solution for the type with the highest 
willingness to pay within each group, and lower than (socially) optimal consumption level for 
the other types.  
 
6. Tagged vs. non-tagged solution 
We are now in a position to compare the two solutions (NLP and SNLP). It is obvious that the 
solution with tagging yields a higher level of profit for the operator. More precisely, profits 
cannot be lower because the operator continues to have the option to offer the same pricing 
scheme as under NLP. This is of course just a fallback option for the operator and in general we 
can expect the solution to differ in which case profits will be strictly larger with tagging. The 
less straightforward question is how welfare is affected by tagging. To deal with this issue, 
recall that total surplus in our setting (expressed by the first line of (9)) only depends on the 
consumption levels of the various types. Comparing these consumption levels across solutions 
by making use of expressions (10)–(13), (14)–(17) and (22)–(23) yields 
 2 2 2
nt t
b b bq q q
    (26) 
 1 1 1
nt t
b b bq q q
    (27) 
 2 2 2
nt t
a a aq q q
    (28) 
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 1 1 1
nt t
a a aq q q
    (29) 
 
In words, when tagging is introduced, the solution in the highest group does not change, but we 
move closer to the optimal solution in the lower tag. More precisely, the high type in the low 
group now also consumes the efficient level, while the consumption level of the low type 
increases but remains below the optimal level. These results (along with the property that total 
surplus, S , is a concave function of any of the consumption levels) immediately implies that 
welfare (total surplus) is higher with tagging than without.8 In other words, in our setting the 
profit-maximizing solution under tagging (SNLP) always yields a higher level of welfare than 
the profit-maximizing solution without tagging (NLP).  
 Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. As shown by equations (6)–(8) the 
consumption level of any type, i , affects the informational rents of all the “higher” types (with 
a higher willingness to pay) to which type i  individuals are “connected” directly or indirectly 
via binding incentive constraints. The optimal policy strikes a balance between surplus (which 
can potentially be extracted) and information rents and to reduce these rents, consumption 
levels are distorted downwards. From this perspective, we can easily understand that for group 
b  nothing changes when tagging is introduced. Specifically, the 1bq  equally affects the rents 
of type 2b  in both cases (while 2bq  does not affect any rents). Now in the untagged case 2aq  
and 1aq  affect the rents of all types in group b  and 1aq  additionally affects the rents of type
2a . When tagging is introduced, the link between groups is cut; inter-group mimicking is no 
longer possible. Consequently, 2aq  no longer affects any rents (and is left undistorted) while 
1aq  solely influences the rents of type 2a . This argument not only explains the result but it also 
indicates that it is quite robust and could easily be generalized to more general distributions of 
the taste parameter. In particular, it immediately follows for the case where the tags constitute a 
partition of a continuous distribution into two (or more intervals).  
 Note that this is exactly similar to age related discounts in the airline sector. Airlines can 
give major discounts to young passenger without worrying that this offer be used by top level 
executives with a high willingness to pay simply because there are few such executives in that 
age group.  
 
7. Variations and extensions 
To assess the robustness of this result we now consider two variations and extensions. In the 
first, we consider the case of overlapping groups. In the second, we assume that a simple linear 
tariff (the stamp price) is available to all customers and determines their reservation utility 
levels.  
7.1 Overlapping groups 
Assume now that 1 1 2 2a b a b       so that the groups overlap in the sense that (as far as   
is concerned) the high type of the low group is above the low type of the high group; see Figure 
                                                 
8To see this, differentiate the first line of (9) with respect to iq  which yields  
2
2
( )
( ) 0
i i i
i
i i
i
S u q c
q
S u q
q




   
   
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2. It is plain that this has no impact on the rules that determine tagged solution which continues 
to be given by expressions (22)–(23) in Section 5. Note however that the actual levels change (
 ’s are different so that the solution will differ). Similarly, the first-best solution is determined 
by the same expression as above, namely equations (10)–(13). 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the untagged solution will change. We show in Appendix A1 that the FOCs defining 
the solution are now given by 
 2 2 2( )
nto
b b bu q c     (30) 
 2 2 2 2(2 ) ( )
nto
a b a au q c      (31) 
 1 2 1 1(3 2 ) ( )
nto
b a b bu q c      (32) 
 1 1 1 1(4 3 ) ( )
nto
a b a au q c      (33) 
 
where the superscript nto  is used to denote the non-tagged (NLP) solution with overlapping 
groups. Comparing the different solutions we get 
 2 2 2
nto t
b b bq q q
    (34) 
 2 2 2
nto t
a a aq q q
    (35) 
 1 1 1
nto t
b b bq q q
   (36) 
 1 1 1
nto t
a a aq q q
   (37) 
 
These expressions show that the three solutions yield the same level of 2bq , while the move to 
tagging increases 2aq  and brings it closer to its optimal level. Consequently, the total surplus 
generated by the high type in each group increases when tagging is introduced. On the other 
hand, the impact of tagging on the consumption level of low types (and thus on the surplus 
generated by them) is ambiguous. Depending on the distribution of  ’s tagging can thus 
increase as well as decrease consumption and total surplus of low types. To sum up, with 
overlapping groups the impact on welfare is ambiguous. We shall revisit this case (and show 
that a welfare enhancement continues to be possible) in the numerical Section 8.  
7.2 Linear pricing as outside option 
So far we have assumed that the reservation utility was the same for all and normalized to zero. 
The normalization to zero is not important and has no impact on the results. However, the 
assumption that the reservation utility is the same for all agents is important. In the postal sector 
we can think about the reservation utility as being determined by the stamp price; every agent 
has the option of not accepting the contract and paying the normal stamp price for its mail. The 
Figure 2: Overlaping groups
1a 2a1b 2b
Group a
Group b
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reservation utility of an agent with parameter   is then given by  
 ( ) max ( )
q
v p u q pq      (38) 
where p  is the stamp price.  
 To determine the optimal pricing scheme (optimal contract) both without and with 
tagging, we now have to solve a principal-agent problem with type-dependent participation 
constraints which does not necessarily yield nice and simple solutions; see e.g., Laffont and 
Martimort (2001, Section 3.3.). Depending on the profile of binding incentive and participation 
constraints many different regimes can occur.9 Here, the profile of participation constraints is 
not arbitrary but determined by (38) so that we can obtain some results. In particular, we can 
look for conditions under which the various solutions considered in Sections 4 and 5 remain 
valid under the reformulated participation constraints. More precisely, we examine when we 
will obtain the same quantities for everyone while payments are shifted by a constant.  
The participation constraint will be binding for individual 1a  and his utility is given by 
1( )av p   (rather than zero). This positive utility level adds a constant to the (profit) maximizing 
problem which has no impact on the FOCs and on the optimal quantities.  
With the consumption profile determined in Section 4 the utility of type 2a  is determined by 
the incentive constraint and now given by 
 2 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
nt
a a a au q v p       
The solution we derived continues to be valid if  
 2 1 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nt
a a a a au q v p v p          (39) 
In words, (39) says that the incentive constraint implies a utility level for 2a  that is 
sufficiently large that the (reformulated) participation constraint is automatically satisfied. We 
can derive similar conditions for the other individuals as well as for the tagged solution. Note 
that even when the optimal quantities are not affected the sharing of the surplus is affected.  
To get a better understanding of these conditions let us consider an illustration with a simple 
specification of preferences, namely 
 ( ) 2u q q   (40) 
The indirect utility is defined by  
 ( ) max 2
q
v p q pq      
which yields 
 
2
2q p
   
and 
 
2
( )v p
p
    
Further, we obtain from (17) that  
 
2
1 2
1 2
1
(4 3 )nt a a
a
a
q
c
    
so that condition (39) can be rewritten as  
                                                 
9When the reservation utility is the same for all types, a binding participation constraint for the low type along with 
the incentive constraints for the other types ensures that no further participation constraints are binding. When the 
reservation utility level depends on the type this is no longer necessarily true. 
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2 2
1 2 1 2
2 1
1
(4 3 )2( ) a a a aa a
ac p p
          
Rearranging yields  
 1 2 1 2
1
(4 3 )2 a a a a
ac p
       
This condition will certainly be satisfied when p  is sufficiently large. Note that p  has to be 
“much” larger than c , because it includes some markup to cover the fixed cost (or part of it).  
 To sum up, the solutions derived above, as well as all the welfare comparisons remain 
valid when the linear tariff becomes available provided that the stamp price is sufficiently large.  
 
8. Numerical example 
We now present some illustrative numerical examples. They are based on the utility function  
 ( ) qu q

   
with 1 20   . 
Marginal costs are the same for all types and given by 1 2 1 2 0 1a a b bc c c c       
Table 1 reports the results obtained when 1 2 1 20 19 0 24 0 3 0 41a a b b              , which 
corresponds to the separate group case.  
 
 First-Best NLP (no tag) SNLP (tag) 
q1a 1.965  0.381  1.425 
q2a 2.513  1.212  2.513 
q1b 3.179  1.965  1.965 
q2b 4.416  4.416  4.416 
    
CS1a  0.000  0.000 
CS2a  0.953  1.018 
CS1b  2.164  0.000 
CS2b  4.440  2.276 
Sum of CS  7.557 3.293
    
Profit a  7.355  7.483 
Profit b  7.796  12.125 
Sum of Profit  15.151 19.607
    
Welfare a  8.308  8.500 
Welfare b  14.400  14.400 
Sum of Welfare  22.708 22.901
 
Table 1 : Non overlapping groups - ߠଵ௔ ൌ 0.19, ߠଶ௔ ൌ 0.24, ߠଵ௕ ൌ 0.3, ߠଶ௕ ൌ 0.41 
 
 
 The first numerical column of Table 1 reports the first-best quantities, while the other two 
columns contain the results obtained with, respectively, the NLP (no tag) and SNLP (with tag) 
solutions. The numerical results (of course) confirm the analytical ranking of quantities when 
nonlinear prices are used; see equations (26)–(29). Furthermore, we obtain the same ranking for 
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welfare as for profits: tagging is better than no tagging.  
 We have also studied how the nonlinear optimal solutions resist to the introduction of a 
linear segment (the stamp price p ) as an outside option in the separate group case. Intuitively, 
the larger the value of p , the lower th  reservation utility. Starting with the solution without 
tagging, we investigate the minimum stamp price p  such that the considered solution (NLP or 
SNLP) gives more utility to the four types of consumers than the linear pricing option which 
consists of using stamped mail. By definition, the lowest type 1a  receives exactly this  
reservation utility level in the nonlinear solution with stamps. The minimum value of p  is 
then 0 536p    for 2a , 0 331p    for 1b  and 0 247p    for 2b .10 We then obtain that, 
even though the  reservation utility (with the stamp) increases with  , the utility (or rent) level 
at the nonlinear solution increases even faster with  , so that higher  s resist better (i.e., to 
smaller values of p ) to the introduction of the stamp than lower  s.  
 We have performed the same exercise for the nonlinear tagged solution. Due to the tag, 
we only have to check two participation constraints, namely those of individuals 2 in both 
groups. We obtain that the minimum value of p  satisfying the participation constraint with a 
linear  pricing option is 0 153p    for 2a  and 0 186p    for 2b . Consequently, unlike in 
the tagging solution, the value of p  actually increases with  . Observe that the value of p  is 
lower, for a given 2 j , with tagging than without tagging. We can see from Table 1 that the 
tagged solution gives more utility than the non-tagged to agents 2 in group a , allowing this 
solution to better resist the introduction of a linear alternative. As for group b , the utility level 
of 2b  is actually lower with tagging than without, but the participation constraint is also 
different, since we add the larger 1( )bv p   to the utility with tagging, compared to 1( )av p   
without tagging. This latter effect is larger than the former in our setting, resulting in a (slightly) 
lower minimum value of p  with tagging than without.  
We now move to the numerical examples with overlapping groups. The easiest way to proceed 
is to take the same four values of  , but to swap the values of 2a  and 1b , to obtain 
1 1 2 20 19 0 24 0 3 0 41a b a b                The results are reported in Table 2.  
  
                                                 
10To put these numbers in perspective, they are all much smaller than the profit-maximizing linear price, which 
equals 2. 
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 First-Best NLP (no tag) SNLP (tag) 
q1a 1.965  0.381  0.791 
q2a 3.179  1.965  3.179 
q1b 2.513  1.212  0.687 
q2b 4.416  4.416  4.416 
    
CS1a  0.000  0.000 
CS2a  2.164  2.174 
CS1b  0.953  0.000 
CS2b  4.440  3.337 
Sum of CS  7.557  5.511 
    
Profit a  7.428  7.542 
Profit b  7.723  9.696 
Sum of Profit  15.151  17.237 
    
Welfare a  9.593  9.716 
Welfare b  13.116  13.033 
Sum of Welfare  22.708  22.748 
 
Table 2 : Overlapping groups - ߠଵ௔ ൌ 0.19, ߠଶ௔ ൌ 0.3, ߠଵ௕ ൌ 0.24, ߠଶ௕ ൌ 0.41 
 
 
 The solutions without tagging are not affected by this change, except for the renaming of 
1b  into 2a , and vice versa. Total consumer surplus, profit and welfare are not affected by this 
renaming of  s, but of course their distribution among the two categories a  and b  is 
affected. As for the separate groups case, we continue to obtain a higher welfare level with 
tagging than without it.  
 We have seen in Section 1 that the solution with tagging need not always dominate the 
one without tagging when groups overlap. Our conjecture is that tagging dominates NLP when 
the overlap between the groups is “small enough”, but that it may perform less well than NLP 
when the overlap is “large enough”. To check this conjecture, we have modified the distribution 
of  s who now belong to the set 0 16 0 21 0 3 0 41{ }       . Table 3 reports the results with the 
separate case, where we know from theory that tagging dominates. As for the overlapping case, 
observe that the overlap is larger than in the case studied in Table 2, since it now concerns the 
interval [0 21 0 3]    rather than [0 24 0 3]    as previously. Table 4 shows that, with overlapping 
groups, the solution with tagging now performs less well, from a welfare viewpoint, than the 
solution without tagging. This confirms our conjecture that tagging is better for welfare when 
the division of types into groups is close to a partition with respect to the willingness to pay. In 
other words, segmentation (tagging) is more likely to be welfare improving when it conveys 
“precise” information about the unobserved distribution (that is when tags do not overlap or 
when overlap is not too important).  
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 First-Best NLP (no tag) SNLP (tag) 
q1a 1.640  0.089  1.106 
q2a 2.184  0.282  2.184 
q1b 3.179  1.965  1.965 
q2b 4.416  4.416  4.416 
    
CS1a  0.000  0.000 
CS2a  0.886  1.005 
CS1b  2.575  0.000 
CS2b  4.851  2.276 
Sum of CS  8.312 3.281
    
Profit a  5.854  6.249 
Profit b  6.974  12.125 
Sum of Profit  12.828 18.374
    
Welfare a  6.740  7.254 
Welfare b  14.400  14.400 
Sum of Welfare  21.140 21.655
 
Table 3 : Non overlapping groups - ߠଵ௔ ൌ 0.16, ߠଶ௔ ൌ 0.21, ߠଵ௕ ൌ 0.3, ߠଶ௕ ൌ 0.41 
 
 
 
 First-Best NLP (no tag) SNLP (tag) 
q1a 1.640  0.089  0.184 
q2a 3.179  1.965  3.179 
q1b 2.184  0.282  0.089 
q2b 4.416  4.416  4.416 
    
CS1a  0.000  0.000 
CS2a  2.575  2.573 
CS1b  0.886  0.000 
CS2b  4.851  3.543 
Sum of CS  8.312  6.116 
    
Profit a  6.260  6.388 
Profit b  6.568  8.559 
Sum of Profit  12.828  14.947 
    
Welfare a  8.836  8.961 
Welfare b  12.304  12.102 
Sum of Welfare  21.140  21.063 
 
Table 4 : Overlapping groups - ߠଵ௔ ൌ 0.16, ߠଶ௔ ൌ 0.3, ߠଵ௕ ൌ 0.21, ߠଶ௕ ൌ 0.41 
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9. Conclusion 
We have studied pricing policies which combine market segmentation (tagging) with nonlinear 
pricing. More precisely, we have assumed that the operator can group customers into a certain 
number of categories on the basis of an exogenously observable characteristic at no cost. We 
have characterized the solution under SNLP in a four types, two categories setting and 
compared it to the standard NLP solution. We have shown that when the groups do not overlap 
(the highest willingness to pay in the low group is smaller than the lowest willingness to pay in 
the high group) the profit maximizing SNLP solution yields a higher welfare (total surplus) than 
the standard NLP solution. While we have restricted our attention to the simplest possible 
setting, this result could easily be generalized to more general distributions of the taste 
parameter (and in particular to the case of a continuous distribution). This result shows that the 
use of nonlinear pricing within categories may eliminate the well-known ambiguity regarding 
the welfare impact of third-degree price discrimination.  
 We then have considered two extensions. In the first, we have analyzed the case of 
overlapping groups. We have shown that the total surplus generated by the high type in each 
group increases when tagging is introduced. On the other hand, the impact of tagging on the 
consumption level of low types (and thus on the surplus generated by them) is ambiguous. We 
have provided an example where the total welfare impact continues to be positive. We have also 
shown that when the overlap is sufficiently significant, the opposite result can obtain. 
Consequently, the welfare impact of tagging in that case is essentially an empirical question 
which hinges on the distribution of the taste parameter and the capability of the operator to 
design the tags in a sufficiently informative way. When the observable characteristic is 
sufficiently revealing to partition the customers into separate groups according to their 
(unobservable) willingness to pay, segmentation is always welfare improving. In the second 
extension, we have assumed that a simple linear tariff (the stamp price) is available to all 
customers and determines their reservation utility levels. We have shown that this specific 
feature of the postal sector does not affect our results provided that the stamp price is 
sufficiently large.  
 To sum up, this paper shows that conceding more pricing flexibility to a 
profit-maximizing operator who is able to categorize its customers according to their valuation 
of postal services, can be welfare enhancing. In the current context of declining mail volumes 
resulting from the competition of electronic means of communication, the positive impact of 
such discriminatory pricing policy on volume should be taken into account and considered as an 
instrument to safeguard universal postal service. Hence, identifying relevant customer 
segments and determining the value of postal services for those customers become a relevant 
issue for postal operators. Regulators have a role to play in facilitating price-discrimination 
when it is welfare enhancing, by assessing pricing policies according to their economic impact 
rather than by adopting a dogmatic point of view based on some non-discrimination principle.  
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Appendix 
A1. Derivation of the FOCs for the overlapping groups case 
Continuing to assume that incentive constraints are binding according to decreasing  , we now 
get a different pattern of binding constraints. Accordingly the profit maximizing problem of the 
operator is now given by 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2max ( )a a b b a a a a b b b bt t t t F c q c q c q c q         (A1) 
 2 2 2 2 2 2s t ( ) ( )b b b b a au q t u q t        (A2) 
 2 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( )a a a a b bu q t u q t      (A3) 
 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )b b b b a au q t u q t      (A4) 
 1 1 1( ) 0a a au q t      (A5) 
 
Proceeding exactly like in Section (4), namely substituting the it ’s in the objective function 
from the constraints and then differentiating with respect to iq ’s, we obtain conditions 
(30)–(33) 
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